Australia’s national resilience inquiry overlooks a critical weakness

Inquiry Wants Industries to Collaborate — What Industries?

Australia’s national resilience inquiry overlooks a critical weakness: decades of deindustrialisation have left the nation dangerously dependent on imports, unprepared for compounding threats and strategic disruption.

While the Federal Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence inquiry into national resilience and civil preparedness is greatly welcomed, its terms of reference are lacking in several respects.

The inquiry does not define “national resilience”.

“National resilience” means a society with a cohesive view of the threats to its sovereignty; a country with serious strategic industries and a military that together are capable of withstanding, defeating/deterring and recovering from wars, protracted crises or disruptions, while keeping essential services, the economy, governance and the military functional at a high level.

Somewhat lacking a sense of urgency as to the threats facing Australia, the committee says its purpose is to inquire into “whole-of-nation support to National Defence”, collaborating and coordinating with state, territory and local governments, the private sector, and the broader Australian community to ensure “continuity of government and the availability of essential services, including fuel, in (a) crisis or conflict”.

This begs further questions.

Questions

Collaborating and coordinating among what industries? Australia has de-industrialised. Does anybody see the elephant in the room?

Under radical free-trade policies, critical manufacturing and heavy industries have been either destroyed, diminished or shifted offshore. Australia barely has the critical mass of industries capable of keeping the nation running should trade routes be cut. The nation is utterly dependent on imported liquid fuels, motor vehicles, fertilisers, computers, computer chips, smartphones, water-processing chemical, and consumer goods.

Australia’s manufacturing is just 5 per cent of the economy, one of the lowest in the developed world. The sector is half the GDP size of the U.S. and a quarter that of China. And as News Weekly has revealed, Australia is set to become a net importer of food and fibre within 11 years.

As well, Australia has allowed China to become its major trading partner, when Beijing stands out as our most likely adversary.

Further, where is the proposal for national resilience exercises — like those run by Singapore, Israel, Sweden and Finland, to name but a few — that are necessary to bring the nation together to define the threats, rebuild strategic industries and to build skills, collaboration and coordination between all sectors of society?

Moreover, where is the sense of urgency? Since the 1970s, Australia has lost its focus on societal preparation for war, focusing instead on national disaster planning for single events like cyclones, floods, fires and droughts.

But as pointed out by Mike Burgess, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) Director-General of Security, we are now in an environment of concurrent, cascading and compounding threats. The emphasis is “compounding”. We are organised to manage events, but we are not nearly as well organised to manage accumulating threats.

What Is to Be Done?

First, double manufacturing: It must double in size in the next decade, focused on the strategic industries needed to keep the economy functioning in a crisis. Australia is blessed with every resource, a high-functioning scientific community and an educated workforce. All of which are necessary for rebuilding the nation’s industrial base.

What we can’t produce, we must stockpile; and we must prioritise trade with trusted and reliable allies.

Second, a national development bank to provide the investment funding for this major undertaking.

Third, national resilience exercises are needed. They involve all institutions: federal, state and local government departments and agencies; public utilities, major manufacturing, agricultural and service agencies, major service industries, major utilities, and all industrial sectors. They are the means to:

• achieve a wide national consensus as to the urgent need to finance and build the strategic industries Australia needs;

• double our defence forces;

• build collaboration and cohesion through the structures of society.

RSL Australia national president Peter Tinley recently addressed the National Press Club. He said that the RSL was running a campaign leading up to the next federal election for “a national preparedness framework, made up of three measures: An act that makes preparing this country a continuing legal duty; an independent commission to advise which resilience measures are worth the money, and an adviser at the centre of government who answers for whether this country is ready.”

Tinley argued that there is community support for much stronger government action. He pointed to the National Security College, which surveyed over 20,000 Australians, asking them about 15 different threats. Fewer than one in five believed Australia was very or fully prepared for any of them.

“That is not a complacent public. It is one that has reached the conclusion ahead of its institutions,” Tinley said.

Whatever the committee’s final recommendations, the critical thing that the inquiry cannot do is produce the statesman to lead Australia through the treacherous seas ahead.

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Republished with thanks to News Weekly.

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ODM Daily Commentary

Let’s be honest: Australia is dangerously unprepared for the threats we face. We have de-industrialised. We have outsourced our manufacturing. We have become dependent on imports for fuel, vehicles, fertilisers, computers, chips, smartphones, and even water-processing chemicals. And now a parliamentary inquiry wants industries to “collaborate” on national resilience. What industries? We barely have any left.

The article from News Weekly is a devastating critique of Australia’s strategic vulnerability. Manufacturing is just 5 per cent of the economy—one of the lowest in the developed world. It is half the GDP size of the US and a quarter that of China. Within 11 years, Australia is set to become a net importer of food and fibre. And our major trading partner is China, our most likely adversary.

The inquiry’s terms of reference do not define “national resilience.” The committee talks about “whole-of-nation support to National Defence” and “collaborating and coordinating” with state, territory, and local governments, the private sector, and the community. But it lacks a sense of urgency. It lacks a proposal for national resilience exercises like those run by Singapore, Israel, Sweden, and Finland. And it lacks a plan to rebuild the strategic industries we need.

ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess has warned that we are in an environment of “concurrent, cascading and compounding threats.” The emphasis is “compounding.” We are organised to manage events, but not accumulating threats.

The article proposes three solutions. First, double manufacturing in the next decade, focused on strategic industries. What we cannot produce, we must stockpile. And we must prioritise trade with trusted allies. Second, establish a national development bank to fund this undertaking. Third, conduct national resilience exercises involving all institutions to build consensus, double our defence forces, and build collaboration.

RSL Australia national president Peter Tinley has called for a national preparedness framework: an act that makes preparing the country a continuing legal duty, an independent commission to advise on resilience measures, and an adviser at the centre of government who answers for whether the country is ready. He notes that the National Security College surveyed over 20,000 Australians. Fewer than one in five believed Australia was prepared for any of 15 threats. “That is not a complacent public,” Tinley said. “It is one that has reached the conclusion ahead of its institutions.”

The comment section reflects the frustration. One reader says: “Australian government needs to concentrate on these wider issues. Stop this woke philosophy that’s infiltrating every aspect of our lives. Let’s get back to common sense and Nationalism.”

So here is the challenge: demand a serious national resilience strategy. Rebuild our industrial base. Stockpile essential materials. Conduct national exercises. And elect leaders who will prepare us for the threats ahead.

Australia is de-industrialised and dangerously exposed. It is time to rebuild.

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